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North American Natural Gas Model
Impact of cross-border trade with Mexico
Felipe Feijooa, Daniel Huppmannb,d Larissa Sakiyamaa Sauleh Siddiquia,c,d
February 10, 2016
Natural gas as a source of energy has attracted a lot of interest as its
emissions rate and price are lower than other fossil fuel energy sources.
In the U.S., natural gas-red power generation has been rising, as coal has
declined as a share of the fuel mix. Likewise, Mexico recently launched
its energy reform with focus on greatly expanding use of natural gas over
other fossil fuels, primarily in the energy sector, by opening the market
to private investors. These recent economic and policy changes, along
with increasing gas production in the U.S. (shale gas boom) are likely to
drive the natural gas market in North America in a new direction. For
instance, the Annual Energy Outlook 2015 describes the U.S. for the rst
time as a net exporter of natural gas (via pipelines and LNG) by 2017.
In order to study the current North American gas market with its new
regulations like the Mexican energy reform, this paper presents the North
American Natural Gas Market Model (NANGAM). We propose a long-
term partial-equilibrium model of the United States, Mexican, and Cana-
dian gas markets. NANGAM considers more granular details regarding
market regions and pipelines in Mexico than other existing models, allows
for endogenous infrastructure expansion, and is built in ve year time-
steps up to 2040, considering three seasons (low, high, and peak demand)
for each time-step. NANGAM is calibrated using up-to-date data, which
reects current gas market trends, such as the increasing U.S. shale gas
production. Using NANGAM, we assess the implications of the Mexican
energy reform using a set of ad-hoc future scenarios. Results from the
model show that, in the case of disappointing development of natural gas
production in Mexico, the census region US7 (Texas and adjacent states)
is the most aected, reaching an increase of natural gas production of up
to 12% by 2040 compared to baseline projections.
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1 Introduction
The US shale boom and new power plant regulations recently announced by the En-
vironmental Protection Agency (EPA), aiming to curb greenhouse gas emission and
mitigate global warming, have stimulated substantial academic debate and numerical
simulation exercises to understand the future role of natural gas in North America
(e.g., Huntington, 2007, 2015). Furthermore, the US is expected to become a signi-
cant net exporter of natural gas over the next years, as China and Mexico are shifting
from its reliance on coal to cleaner alternatives. Alas, to date, there is very little
academic focus on the role of Mexico.
Natural gas demand grew by 64% in Mexico between 2004 and 2013, primarily
led by the increasing consumption from the electricity sector. Due to a lack of in-
vestment incentives, production did not increase at the same pace as demand, and
proven gas reserves in Mexico decreased from 2.0 trillion cubic meters in 1993, to
0.4 tcm in 2003 and 0.3 tcm in 2013 (BP, 2015). Production growth of natural gas
in the South-Southeast Mexican region is projected to be 0.4% per year through 2019
(Congressional Research Service, 2015). Mexico's state-owned petroleum company,
PEMEX, consumes increasing portions of this gas production for exploration, pro-
duction, and rening activities1. Combining these circumstances with limited future
LNG importing capacity, pipeline imports from the U.S. are crucial to meet growing
national demand (EIA, 2014).
Approximately 69% of Mexico's gas imports came from the U.S. in 2014, making
Mexico have one the highest levels of dependency from a single supplier (Biresselioglu
et al., 2015). Pipeline ows from the U.S. to Mexico averaged 2 billion cubic feet per
day (Bcf/d) that year. Projects in Mexico to increase pipeline capacity are underway
and are expected to import more than 5 Bcf/d of natural gas by 2020. With pipeline
capacities expansions and few LNG import terminals, it is expected that LNG imports
will be displaced by cheaper natural gas from the United States (EIA, 2015c).
On an assessment made by the Energy Information Administration (EIA), Mexi-
can technically recoverable shale resources are ranked as the 6th largest in the world
(Congressional Research Service, 2015). Gas resources are largely concentrated in the
Northeast and South-Southeast regions of Mexico. The Burgos Basin in the Northeast
contains approximately 393 Tcf of Mexico's technically recoverable shale gas resources,
most of the country's prospective reserves. However, in the rst semester of 2014, Pe-
mex announced plans on drilling 10 shale test wells, a small number compared with
the more than 27,000 wells drilled in Texas in the same year (EIA, 2015c). Therefore,
in order to scale up shale gas production, the Mexican government needs to address
issues regarding lack of infrastructure and capacity expansion. In order to promote
natural gas production in Mexico and reduce reliance on U.S. imports, on December
20, 2013, the Mexican government promulgated the Energy Reform. The initiative
opened up new opportunities for the private sector in the upstream (exploration, de-
velopment, and production) and downstream (rening and marketing of the resource)
sector of the oil and gas industry. On what was called the `Round Zero' of the re-
form, Pemex was awarded with 83% of the country's probable reserves and 21% of
its prospective reserves. Independent bids to develop elds of both unconventional
and conventional natural gas resources will probably come through partnerships with
Pemex in prot-sharing contracts (Congressional Research Service, 2015). Pemex will
remain a state-owned company but will be given more budgetary and administrative
autonomy. The energy reforms also call for empowering the regulatory agencies of
SENER (Secretaria de Energa) and The National Hydrocarbon Commission (CNH),
and for creating the Agencia de Seguridad, Energa y Ambiente (ASEA), a new envi-
ronmental protection agency (EIA, 2015c).
1See further details at https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=16471. Accessed
on January 19, 2016.
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With the opening of Mexico's energy industry, shale development has been one of
the areas gathering interest. Some gas formations in northern Mexico are attractive
to U.S. companies due to their proximity to developments in Texas (Congressional
Research Service, 2015). As an example, the Burgos Basin in the Northeast is an
extension of the Eagle Ford Basin, a development in Texas with good recovery rates.
With this context, pipeline imports from the United States into Mexico are most
likely to continue growing, particularly in areas that are not connected to other parts
of the country (Northwest Mexican region) (EIA, 2014). A detailed description of the
Mexican territory is provided in Section 2.
With the likely changes in the natural gas demand and infrastructure, models
with more granularity in terms of regions and pipelines are needed. The main goal
of this eort is to develop such a model. This paper presents the North American
Natural Gas Model (NANGAM). It is a long-term partial-equilibrium model of the
natural gas markets including Canada, the U.S., and Mexico. NANGAM is the rst
natural gas model that considers a high granularity in terms of geography (regions) and
infrastructure (pipelines and supply) in North America, specically Mexico. Further
details of NANGAM are presented in Section 3. We use NANGAM to study the
impacts of new energy regulations in Mexico on the North American continent by
analyzing the cost and benets of cross-border ows on natural gas.
Other models in the literature, while also being large-scale numerical applications,
do not consider a suciently high level of detail of the infrastructure in North America,
in particular for Mexico. For instance, one of the rst natural gas models with focus
in North America is the Gas Trade Model (GTM, Beltramo et al., 1986). The GTM
was developed in the late 80's and considered Mexico as a single demand-production
node. A large scale linear complementarity model for North America was presented
in Gabriel et al. (2005b). Even though the model has a high granularity of the U.S.,
the Mexican gas market was not taken into account. Also, this model did not consider
endogenous capacity expansion decisions. The World Gas Model (WGM) described
in Egging et al. (2010), an extension of the work developed in Gabriel et al. (2005b)
and Gabriel et al. (2005a), considered six regions in the U.S and treated Mexico as a
single region. The authors in Siddiqui and Gabriel (2013) used the WGM to study
the impact of a shale producer having market power. Authors expanded the number
of regions in the U.S. to 10, but kept Mexico and Canada as single regions. A model
similar in scope to the WGM is the Global Gas Model (GGM, Egging, 2013), but it
includes more features and functionality with regard to stochastic scenarios.
The Gas Market Modeling with Energy Substitution (GaMMES) developed in
Abada et al. (2013) (a generalized Nash Cournot model) did consider endogenous
decisions for capacity expansion and long-term contracts but it was used to study the
northwestern European natural gas trade. The FRISBEE model (Aune et al., 2009)
is a recursively dynamic partial-equilibrium model with 13 global regions. However,
Mexico is not considered among them. The model developed in Huppmann and Egging
(2014) represents Europe by 15 nodes, of which eleven are European union (EU)
member states (or aggregates thereof). The rest of the world is aggregated into thirteen
nodes by continent or major regions. Models that have a focus on the European market
include GASMOD (Holz et al., 2008), GaMMES (Abada et al., 2013, described earlier),
and GASTALE (Boots et al., 2003; Lise and Hobbs, 2009). Other models with a
European focus that analyze imperfect competition a la Cournot among gas producers
include Boots et al. (2004), Egging and Gabriel (2006), and Lise and Hobbs (2008).
Finally, Gridnet (www.rbac.com) and ICFs Gas Market Model (ICF GMM2) oer
high details on U.S. coverage, but are designed to support short- and medium-term
decisions. A more detailed summary and comparison of some of the gas market models
described here can be found in Gabriel et al. (2012).
2http://www.ic.com/insights/products-and-tools/gmm
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As mentioned above, dierent models have been used to study the global and the
North American gas market (e.g., Gabriel et al., 2005b; Egging et al., 2010; Gabriel
et al., 2005a; Siddiqui and Gabriel, 2013; Gabriel et al., 2012)). Richter (2015) criti-
cally discusses the potential of U.S. shale gas projections and uses GGM to analyze the
impact of alternative outlooks on the global natural gas market. However, all of these
models treat Mexico as a single node, or exclude it completely. In contrast, we increase
the granularity of the Mexican territory and consider ve consumption/production
market regions as well as more details regarding gas infrastructure (pipelines) network
(see Section 2). Another important feature that distinguishes NANGAM from other
previous natural gas models is that NANGAM incorporates endogenous capacity ex-
pansion in both production and pipeline infrastructure while using a logarithmic cost
function for gas supply (Golombek et al., 1995). Also, NANGAM considers up-to-date
data and projections (used for calibration) and hence it better represents recent de-
velopments due to the shale gas boom, especially in the U.S. The model also includes
three seasons (low, high, peak) each with load/production variations, and gas storage
operators to account for seasonal demand changes (see details in Section 3).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the Mexican
territory and its natural gas markets. Details of the NANGAM model are presented
in Section 3. The description of the data set and dierent future scenarios are presented
in Section 4. Results of the future scenarios are presented in Section 5. Concluding
remarks are in Section 6.
2 Description of the Mexican Market and the Energy Re-
form
Mexico's national territory is divided into ve market regions: Northwest (Mex1),
Northeast (Mex2), Interior-West (Mex3), Interior (Mex4), and South-Southeast (Mex5
SENER, 2013). Figure 1 shows a representation of the Mexican territory. The North-
west and Northeast regions receive all natural gas from the U.S., which is imported
both through private pipelines and pipelines owned by Pemex Gas y Petroqumica
Basica (PGPB), Pemex' natural gas subsidiary. Some of the imports arrive in areas
in the Northwest that do not have other ways to access natural gas (EIA, 2014). O-
shore oil platforms operated by Pemex in the South-Southeast account for 75% of the
country's domestic natural gas production (EIA, 2014). Much of the gas imported in
the Northeast is used in industrial and power plants, and a large amount is sent to
Mexico's interior regions. Consumption growth in natural gas is projected for all ve
regions. The Mexican energy ministry, SENER, estimates that between 2012 and 2027
about 75% of consumption growth is predicted to be in the electric sector driven by
independently operated power plants (EIA, 2014). For instance, the contribution of
natural gas in electricity generation increased from 12.1% in 1996 to 42.6% in 2006,
representing an average annual growth rate of 17.9% (Santoyo-Castelazo et al., 2011).
Table 1: Pipelines among regions in Mexico and the U.S.
Pipelines
Northeast $ South-Southeast
South-Southeast $ Interior
Interior $ Interior-West
US7 $ Northeast
US8 $ Northwest
In 2013, Mexico's dry natural production was approximately 1.6 Tcf, a small de-
cline from the previous year. More than two-thirds of non-associated gas production
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Figure 1: Mexican market regions. Source: Energy Information Administration.
in the country occurred in the Burgos Basin in the Northeast, and most of the re-
mainder from elds in Veracruz in the South-Southeast (EIA, 2015c). Note that the
South-Southeast region contains the largest share of proven gas reserves. However,
production growth of natural gas in the South-Southeast region is projected to be
only 0.4% per year through 2019 (Congressional Research Service, 2015). Regard-
ing associated gas (as a sub-product of oil production), nearly 75% of the country's
production is from oshore oil platforms operated by Pemex in the South-Southeast
region.
With the energy reform, that aims at addressing some of the above mentioned is-
sues, the Pe~na Nieto government has optimistic projections, including a GDP growth
of 1%, lower energy prices, and 500,000 new jobs. Estimates indicate that foreign
investments in the country are to increase $20 billion each year in 2016 and 2017
(Congressional Research Service, 2015). These investments are expected to take ad-
vantage of major unexplored reserves, particularly in the Gulf of Mexico (Year, 2015).
3 The North American Natural Gas Model
NANGAM3 is a long-term partial-equilibrium model of the United States, Mexican,
and Canadian gas markets. There are currently a total of 17 nodes, of which nine
correspond to U.S. census regions, one node to Alaska4, two nodes to Canada (East
and West), and ve to Mexico (Northwest, Northeast, Interior-West, Interior, and
South-Southeast). Of the above mentioned nodes, there are 13 nodes with natural gas
(shale and non-shale) production capacity (census regions 2-9 for the lower-48 states,
one for Alaska, two for Canada, and two for Mexico). The 17 production-demand
nodes are currently connected through 69 pipelines. There are also storage facilities
at each node in the U.S. and Canada. The model allows for endogenous infrastructure
expansion, and is built in ve year time-steps starting in 2010 up to 2040, considering
three seasons (low, high, and peak) for each time-step.
NANGAM is built based on the MultiMod framework. MultiMod is a spatial and
dynamic multi-period representation of the global energy value chain with endogenous
3NANGAM is written in GAMS and data can be accessed using Microsoft Access. The
model will be available to all researchers free of charge under a creative commons license.
4Alaska technically belongs to census region 9. However, it was considered that Alaska
belongs to a single region in order to model its own increasing supply projections
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investment in infrastructure capacity (Huppmann and Egging, 2014). MultiMod rep-
resents a market equilibrium between non-cooperative actors in a Nash game, where
each player seeks to maximize its individual prots. It allows to include several types
of regulatory interventions in the context of climate change mitigation and energy pol-
icy (e.g., greenhouse gas emission constraints and taxes, fuel mix mandates, average
emission intensity restrictions). MultiMod is formulated as a Mixed Complementarity
Problem and can hence include Cournot or conjectural variations, market power for
some or all suppliers, as well as use dual variables (i.e., prices) in the players' objective
functions.
The current version of NANGAM is calibrated using up-to-date data from the
U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), Annual Energy Outlook 2015, the
Canadian National Energy Board, Mexican Secretary of Energy (Secretara de Energa)
SENER, and PEMEX (National Mexican natural gas producer). Details about the
NANGAM data set are presented in Section 4. Note that we aim at matching supply
and demand levels at each node for the base year (2010) and projections (until 2040)
in the calibration process.
The players in the natural gas supply chain (in NANGAM) include suppliers (up-
stream), service providers and infrastructure operators (midstream) such as arc op-
erators for pipelines and storage operators, and a nal demand (downstream) for an
aggregated consumption sector. Each player in NANGAM is prot maximizer. Suppli-
ers produce and sell natural gas. A logarithmic cost function is assumed for suppliers
as it better models the costs associated to produce natural gas with low resources.
Arc operators allocate possibly congested transmission capacity (based on an implicit
auction). This player can be interpreted as a transmission system operator. Storage
operators allow suppliers to shift natural gas between yearly seasons (time slices). Fi-
nal demand for natural gas is modeled via a linear inverse demand curve by sector.
For simplicity, NANGAM assumes an aggregated nal demand sector. Dierent sec-
tors (residential, industrial, energy, etc) will be addressed in future research. Also,
the mathematical structure of NANGAM also allows for extension to multi-objective
programming to determine policies for energy and climate market, as studied in Feijoo
and Das (2014), Feijoo and Das (2015), and Siddiqui and Christensen (2016). Further
modeling details and the mathematical formulation can be found in A.
4 The North American Natural Gas Market: data set and
case study
In this section, the data sources utilized to calibrate NANGAM with are described
as well as projections for U.S., Canada, and Mexico. The data set is available upon
request (Microsoft Access format). Also, future scenarios are presented.
4.1 Projections for the U.S.
Data for production and demand projection in the U.S. were obtained from
the Annual Energy Outlook 2015 (AEO2015). Natural gas production in the
United States increased by 35% from 2005 to 2013, with the natural gas share
of total U.S. energy consumption rising from 23% to 28%. The increase in
production resulted mainly from the development of shale gas resources in the
Lower 48 states and Alaska. According to the AEO2015 reference case, more
than 50% of the total increase in shale natural gas production comes from the
Haynesville (southwestern Arkansas, northwest Louisiana, and East Texas) and
Marcellus (Pennsylvania, west Virginia, southeast Ohio, and upstate New York)
formations. Natural gas production in the U.S. increased from 24.4 Tcf in 2013
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Table 2: Natural gas data sets
Data source
U.S. Energy Information Administration EIA EIA (2014)EIA (2015b)EIA (2015c)
Natural Gas Gross Withdrawals and Production (Dry Production)
Pipeline projects
Annual Energy Outlook 2015 EIA (2015a)
Table: Natural Gas Supply, Disposition, and Prices (Dry Production)
National Energy Board, NEB Canada's Energy Future 2013 NEB (2015)
Supply and Demand Projections to 2035
Supply and Demand Projections to 2035 End-use Energy Demand
Secretaria de Enera SENER (2013)
Prospectiva de Gas Natural y Gas L.P. 2013-2027
Gas y Petroquimica Basica Pemex PEMEX (2015)
Condiciones Generales para la Prestacion del Servicio de Transporte
to 35.5 Tcf in 2040, a 45% increase. Growth in tight gas, federal oshore,
and onshore Alaska production also contributes to overall production growth
over the projection period. Figure 2 shows the projection by census regions
in the U.S. (see Figure 3 for the division of the census regions considered by
NANGAM), where the US7, US8, and US2 are the main producers (representing
the Haynesville and Marcellus formations). Also, starting in 2030, there is an
increase in Alaska's production (27.4 MMcm/d in 2010 to 89.21 MMcm/d in
2040). Natural gas demand increases in the U.S. from 1785.35 in 2010 to 2183.78
MMcm/d in 2040, with the highest demand being in US7 (512.02 MMcm/d in
2040).
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Figure 2: Production projections based on the AEO2015 used for NANGAM
calibration
Future dry natural gas production depends primarily on the size and cost
of tight and shale gas resources, technology improvements, domestic natural
gas demand, and the relative price of oil. According to the AEO2015, United
States becomes a net exporter of natural gas in 2017, driven by increased pipeline
exports to Mexico, reduced imports from Canada, and LNG exports.
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Figure 3: U.S. census regions. Source: Annual Energy Outlook 2015
4.2 Projections for Mexico
In order to expand the granularity of the Mexican market and infrastructure,
information regarding market regions (with its production and consumption
levels), capacities, and pipelines was needed. Information for the market regions
were obtained from SENER (Prospectiva de Gas Natural y Gas L.P. 2013-2027
SENER, 2013). Data for pipelines and capacities were obtained from the U.S.
Energy Information Administration EIA, and Pemex (PEMEX, 2015).
U.S. pipeline exports of natural gas owing south to Mexico have grown
substantially since 2010. Exports to Mexico are projected to continue increasing
according to the AEO2015, mainly because increasing Mexican production is
not expected to keep pace with the country's growing demand for natural gas.
Demand is expected to increase 3.6% yearly (SENER, 2013) through 2027. The
demand increase was determined based on the economic activity and fuel prices
in Mexico (SENER, 2013). The electric power generation is the main sector
and accounts for 75% of consumption growth between 2012 and 2027 (57% of
the national natural gas demand). The demand increase is shown in Figure
4, where natural gas production is 2040 is approximately half of the national
demand. Consumption growth in natural gas is projected for all ve regions.
The northeast region is expected to become the largest consumer, overtaking the
south-southeast region, accounting for 28.8% of the total natural gas demand.
The south-southeast will represent 25% of the national demand.
4.3 Projections for Canada
Projections for production and demand of natural gas in Canada were obtained
from the Canadian National Energy Board (NEB). Canada is the worlds fth
largest producer of natural gas and accounts for around 5% of global production.
Natural gas production in Canada is predominantly from the Western Canadian
8
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Figure 4: Mexican projections used for NANGAM calibration. Data from
SENER, PEMEX and EIA.
Sedimentary Basin (WCSB) in British Columbia, Alberta, and Saskatchewan,
although other gas is produced from oshore Nova Scotia and smaller amounts
are produced in Ontario, New Brunswick, and Nunavut (NEB, 2015).
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Figure 5: Canadian projections used for NANGAM calibration. Data from the
Canadian National Energy Board (NEB).
Figure 5 shows the projection for used in NANGAM for production and
demand of natural gas in Canada. Declines in natural gas prices have reduced
drilling activity for conventional gas in the WCSB in recent years. However
production ramps up continuously until 2035, led by higher levels of tight and
shale gas development. Demand for natural gas grows at an annual average rate
of 1.7% over the projection period. This is an increase of over 5.20 Bcf/d over
the projection period, with the largest increases in the industrial and power
generation sectors NEB (2015).
4.4 Scenarios in Mexico's production and demand of natural gas
The Mexican energy reform is likely to change the future scenario of natural gas
in North America. Even though projection presented in the AEO2015 or NEB
accounted for high demand of natural gas from Mexico, there is huge uncertainty
in future infrastructure investments in Mexico. The Mexican Energy reform
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seeks to create incentives to address the increasing demand (from power and
industry sectors mainly) and to help Pemex to recover production levels. We
present the following scenarios (see Table 3 for a summary) to assess the impact
of the success or failure (at dierent levels) of the Mexican reform;
 Scenario 1) High demand in Mexico without rise in production (failure of
the energy reform and increasing demand in Monterrey, MEX2): Increase
from the reference demand of natural gas demand in Mexico, mainly at
the Northeast (MEX2) region (15% in 2020 and 5% yearly based on 2020
thereafter) where Monterrey city is located (one of the main urban cities).
Demand increases 10% starting on 2020 in regions 1, 3, and 5 and 5%
yearly based on 2020 thereafter. The rise of demand is assumed to be
caused by the increasing demand from the energy sector. Production is
considered to remain the same as in the given projections.
 Scenario 2) High demand and low resources in Mexico (failure of the en-
ergy reform, Burgos and Sabinas are more geologically complex than antic-
ipated): Demand increases as in scenario 1. However, we consider a yearly
increase of production cost (for suppliers) of 5% starting in 2015. This
scenario seeks to represent the case in which the energy reform does not
attract private investors due to increasing cost generated by the complex-
ity of extraction of natural gas at Burgos and Sabinas basins (northeast
and southeast regions).
 Scenario 3) High resources in Mexico (success of the energy reform): As-
suming the energy reform will attract private investors, we consider the
scenario in which there is a 10% reduction in investment of production
capacity at both Northeast and Southeast regions. Also, we assumed a
5% reduction in production cost starting in 2020.
 Scenario 4) High demand and high resources in Mexico (success of the
energy reform): We assumed an increase demand for natural gas demand
as in scenario 1 as well as high resources as in scenario 3.
Table 3: Natural gas market scenarios
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4
High Demand Yes Yes No Yes
High Resources No No Yes Yes
Low Resources No Yes No No
5 Results and Analysis of Future Scenarios
NANGAM is used to simulate and study the four scenarios described in Table
3. Recall that NANGAM is calibrated to match production and demand levels
in the U.S., Canada, and Mexico for the years 2010 until 2040 with 5-years time
steps.
Private pipelines and pipelines owned by PGPB connecting the U.S. and
the Northwest and Northeast regions transport all natural gas imports from the
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U.S (see Figure 1). Therefore, we focused our attention rst on the supply at
the region US7 (Texas mainly), as it is the main producer of natural gas with
direct pipelines to the Northwest or MEX2 region. Recall that, according to
the AEO2015 reference case, more than 50% of the total increase in shale gas
production comes from the Haynesville formation. Figure 6 shows the produc-
tion levels over the time horizon for all scenarios for US7. Dierences of up to
303 MMcm/d (1364 MMcm/d - 1061 MMcm/d) are observed from the scenar-
ios of High demand and low resources in Mexico compared with the scenario
of only high resources in Mexico (demand is the same as the reference case).
Clearly, in the case where incentives are not enough for private investor to de-
velop resources Mexico (remember that we modeled this as higher production
and investment costs), the increasing demand (mainly in the Northeast region)
is accompanied with increasing supply in US7.
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Figure 6: NANGAM results: US7 supply of natural gas for each scenario
Capacity production constraints play a signicant role in the determination
of the natural gas supply. NANGAM allows for endogenous production capacity
investment together with logarithmic cost functions for natural gas5. Figures
7 and 8 show the capacity investment levels in MMcm/d (cumulative over the
time horizon) for all scenarios for US7 and Mexico, respectively.
Region US7 is signicantly impacted by dierent scenarios in Mexico. In-
vestment capacity is higher than in the reference case for scenarios with low
resources in Mexico and high demand. A dierent pattern is observed in the
cases where production and investment costs are lowered in Mexico. We lowered
costs to attract private investors, which are expected to develop the infrastruc-
ture needed to spur natural gas production in the Northeast, South-Southeast
and Gulf of Mexico (EIA, 2015c; SENER, 2013). Remember that a 5% yearly
reduction in production and investment cost was considered.
Investment in capacity production in Mexico is opposite to in US7. Note
that Figure 8 considers the combined investment of the Northeast and South-
Southeast regions. Creating incentives that lower production and investment
5The study presented in Huppmann (2013b) provides a proof that combining endogenous
investment decisions and a logarithmic cost function yields a convex minimization problem.
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Figure 7: Production capacity investment in U.S. census region 7
costs in Mexico will likely result in the development of the infrastructure and
resources needed to decrease natural gas imports from United States. Table 4
presents these changes in imports from the U.S. and among nodes within Mexico
for all scenarios. The changes are calculated as the deviation from the base or
reference scenario (relative changes from the base scenario).
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Figure 8: Production capacity investment in Mexico (MEX2 and MEX5 com-
bined)
As expected, higher demand in Mexico increases ows (imports) from US7
into the Northeast (MEX2) region. The increase over the horizon (2010-2040)
accounts to 25% (see Table 4 for relative changes from base scenario). The
increasing imports are accomplished by increased production (6% higher relative
to the baseline scenario in 2040) in US7, as it was previously shown in Figure 6.
The relative changes in production for all nodes are presented in Tables 5 and
6. When there are low resources in the Northeast and South-Southeast, there is
a further increase of imports, reaching a 53% growth, along with a 11% higher
production in US7 in 2040 (see Table 5). On the other hand, if high resources
of natural gas are available in Mexico, ows from US7 decline by 61% and
production is reduced by 13% in 2040.
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Table 4: Relative changes from base scenario: Natural gas ows
High demand and High demand High demand High resources
low resources and resources
MEX2 ! MEX5 1.58 0.25 1.22 0.23
MEX5 ! MEX4 1.11 1.13 1.11 1.01
MEX4 ! MEX3 1.19 1.21 1.19 1.01
US7 ! MEX2 1.53 0.39 1.25 0.33
US8 ! MEX1 1.18 1.18 1.18 1.00
US7 ! US4 0.99 1.02 0.99 1.02
US7 ! US5 0.96 1.09 0.99 1.09
US7 ! US6 0.98 1.04 0.99 1.04
ALK ! US8 1.03 0.98 1.05 0.95
Table 5: Relative changes from base scenario: Natural gas production in scenario
of low resources in Mexico
2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040
ALK 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.02 1.04 1.04 1.04
CAE 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.01 0.99 1.00
CAW 1.00 1.01 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.00 1.00
US2 1.00 1.02 1.01 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
US3 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.01 1.01
US4 1.00 1.01 1.02 1.02 1.03 1.02 1.03
US5 1.00 1.01 1.05 1.07 1.08 1.07 1.09
US6 1.00 1.01 1.06 1.07 1.09 1.08 1.10
US7 1.00 1.01 1.05 1.07 1.08 1.11 1.11
US8 1.00 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01
US9 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.02 1.01 1.01 1.01
MEX2 1.00 0.83 0.87 0.82 0.78 0.71 0.75
MEX5 1.00 0.82 0.65 0.61 0.54 0.45 0.49
It was also noted that consumption levels in the U.S. are not highly im-
pacted, whereas prices in the U.S. increased/decreased by 1-3% depending on
the scenario. If natural gas production capacity is lower than in the base case,
investment in pipelines from Texas and New Mexico will increase ows from
the U.S. to satisfy increasing demand. Flows will further increase if there is
no infrastructure investment (via incentives on reduced cost in our model). In
this case, it was shown that ows from US7 to Monterrey (Mex2) increased by
around 53% (see Table 4, high demand and low resources scenario). However,
ows from US7 to connected U.S regions are reduced. Hence, we observed higher
natural gas supply in nodes that are connected to US7, as shown in Table 5.
Particularly, nodes US4, US5, and US6 are the most aected. Alaska's produc-
tion and ows into US8 are also increased by 4% (increase starts in 2020) and
3%, respectively. Incoming ows from Alaska to US8 help to address increasing
demand in the MEX1 region, which receives all the natural gas from the U.S.
due to limited pipeline infrastructure within Mexico. Also, Alaska's productions
help to address reduced ows from US7 to US4, US5, and US6. Opposite eects
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are observed in the case where investment and production costs are lowered in
Mexico (for production regions MEX2 and MEX5), as in scenario 3 (high re-
sources). In this case, natural gas production increases signicantly in Mexico
by 2040, whereas US4 through US8 and Alaska reduced their supply levels. The
region US7 is the most aected, reducing its supply by 13% in 2035 and 2040.
Even though supply was reduced in US7, its ows into US4, US5, and US6
are increased up to 9%, hence, lowering production in those regions (see Tables
4 and 6). In the case of Alaska, production is reduced by 6% in 2040 as well as
the ows, which were decreased by 5% in the case of high resources and 2% in
the scenario of high demand and resources in Mexico.
Table 6: Relative changes from base scenario: Natural gas production in scenario
of high resources in Mexico
2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040
ALK 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.95 0.94 0.94
CAE 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.97
CAW 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.98
US2 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
US3 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.00 1.00
US4 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97
US5 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.91 0.91 0.92 0.90
US6 1.00 1.00 0.97 0.90 0.90 0.91 0.89
US7 1.00 1.00 0.95 0.93 0.88 0.87 0.87
US8 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
US9 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.01 1.01 1.01
MEX2 1.00 0.99 1.13 1.66 2.39 2.44 2.49
MEX5 1.00 1.09 1.56 1.88 2.20 2.44 2.53
6 Conclusions and Outlook
According to projections of the 2015 Annual Energy Outlook EIA (2015a), the
U.S. is expected to become a net exporter of fossil fuels due to strongly increasing
shale gas and oil production. Natural gas, in particular, has gained signicant
importance due to its low emissions rate and competitive prices compared to
alternative energy sources. Mexico, through its ongoing energy reform, seeks to
spur the development of gas resources by opening the market to private investors
and hence reduce the increasing gas imports to northern Mexican regions from
the U.S. Assessing the economic and policy implication of these new trends
requires models with updated energy projections and higher granularity for
Mexico. This paper presents the dynamic partial-equilibrium model NANGAM,
which tackles all these issues.
In the current study, NANGAM is calibrated using the most recent data
and projections. We assess the impacts of the Mexican energy reform on North
America under dierent scenarios. We found that, in order to spur natural gas
supply, Mexico highly depends on economic incentives that reduce barriers to
infrastructure investment and keep production costs at competitive levels. As
shown using NANGAM, an expansion of the Mexican gas market will reduce
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dependency on U.S. pipelines imports. NANGAM endogenously predicts invest-
ment strategies in Mexico that are sucient to reduce imports to the Northeast
region of Mexico. Hence, a corresponding reduction of production levels in the
U.S. is also observed, mainly in Texas and Louisiana (census region US7). Re-
duced exports to Mexico results in higher ows within the U.S., as production
volumes from US7 to Mexico are redirected eastwards and to the Midwest (in
particular census regions US4, US5, and US6).
In an alternative scenario, we assume that the incentives created by the
energy reform are not sucient to generate the required capacity expansion in
Mexico to reduce import dependence. As a consequence, growing natural gas
demand in Mexico is satised by further increasing supply from US7. As ows
from US7 to Mexico grow, a ripple eect of higher supply in Alaska, US4, US5,
and US6 is observed. In this scenario, Alaska plays a key role in supplying
gas to the Northwest region. The success of the Mexican energy reform will
therefore play an important role in the further development of the natural gas
sector in North America. It will determine whether the current ow of natural
gas from north to south will prevail, or whether Mexico will increase its self-
suciency with regard to natural gas, reversing the current ow pattern across
the continent.
In any case, the Mexican energy reform will only be one step in an ongoing
overhaul of the North American energy landscape: the technological revolution
facilitating the shale gas boom is the pull factor in the current transformation.
On the push side are growing concerns over climate change and emissions from
fossil fuel combustion, whether in power generation, heating or transportation.
The emission reduction measures recently announced by the U.S. EPA and the
creation of a Mexican environmental protection agency indicate the increasing
need for policies to manage the transition towards a clean and sustainable energy
system.
Analyzing the impacts of such regulatory interventions and the interdepen-
dence with competitive markets requires sophisticated models such as NANGAM.
We plan to extend the modeling framework to account for stochasticity and con-
icting objectives in energy and climate policies via multi-objective optimization
(Feijoo and Das, 2014; Siddiqui and Christensen, 2016). A stochastic framework
is needed to tackle the ambiguity of available resources, technological develop-
ments, and constant environmental regulations that change the direction of the
energy sector. Also, we aim at integrating NANGAM with other energy models
being developed, including electricity and oil models. Suppliers exerting mar-
ket power and strategic behaviors from production of various form of gas (e.g.,
conventional and unconventional), dierent demand sectors, and environmental
regulations (e.g., caps on emissions, taxes, quotas) are also in the outlook of
research using NANGAM.
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A Optimization model for players in NANGAM
A.1 The supplier
Each natural gas supplier maximizes its prots from selling gas, considering costs
for production, transportation and transformation6. Losses during production,
transportation and transformation are considered by the supplier in the nodal
mass balance constraint. Suppliers may behave as competitive (i.e., price-taking
behavior) or act as a Cournot player; the parameter courS is 1 in the latter case,
and 0 in the former. Intermediate conjectural variations (CV) values are also
possible. See Huppmann (2013a) for a discussion on the (diculties regarding
the) interpretation of using CV as \exerting market power".
max
qP ;qA;qC
qO ;qO+;qD;zP
X
y2Y;h2H
n2N;e2E
dfSysdurh
 X
d2D

courSysnd
D
yhnde() + (1  courSysnd)pDyhnde

qDyhsnde
  costPyhsne() 
X
a2A+ne
pAyhaeq
A
yhsae  
X
c2C
pCyhnceq
C
yhsnce
 
X
o2OEe

pO yhnoq
O 
yhsno + p
O+
yhnoq
O+
yhsno

 
X
g2G
pGyngems
P
ysnegq
P
yhsne   invPysnezPysne
!
(1a)
6Note that emissions cost are not studied in the current version of NANGAM. However we
still provide the complete mathematical formulation for NANGAM, including emissions cost
for each player
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st qPyhsne  avlPyhsne
0@capPysne + X
y0<y
depPy0ysnez
P
y0sne
1A (Pyhsne) (1b)X
h2HVvo
durhq
O+
yhsno =
X
h2HVvo
durh(1  lossO o )qO yhsno (Oyvsno) (1c)
(1  lossPsne)qPyhsne  
X
d2D
qDyhsnde
+
X
c2C;f2EC c
transfCyncfeq
C
yhsncf  
X
c2C
qCyhsnce
+
X
a2A+ne
(1  lossAae)qAyhsae  
X
a2A ne
qAyhsae
+
X
o2OEe

qO+yhsno   qO yhsno

= 0 (yhsne) (1d)
zPysne  expPysne (Pysne) (1e)X
y2Y;h2H
durhq
P
yhsne  horPsne (Psne) (1f)
The production cost function extends the one proposed by Golombek et al.
(1995), which yields the marginal cost function given below (Equations 2a{
2c). For conciseness, dcapPyhsne denes the available capacity including prior
expansions as dened in Equation 1b.
costPyhsne() = (linPysne + golPysne)qPyhsne + qudPysne(qPyhsne)2
+ golPysne
dcapPyhsne   qPyhsne ln
 
1  q
P
yhsnedcapPyhsne
!
(2a)
@ costPyhsne()
@ qPyhsne
= linPysne + 2qud
P
ysneq
P
yhsne   golPysne ln
 
1  q
P
yhsnedcapPyhsne
!
(2b)
@ costPyhsne()
@zPy^sne
= golPysneavl
P
yhsnedep
P
y^ysne
 
ln
 
1  q
P
yhsnedcapPyhsne
!
+
qPyhsnedcapPyhsne
!
if y^ < y
(2c)
where dcapPyhsne = avlPyhsne
0@capPysne + X
y0<y
depPy0ysnez
P
y0sne
1A
See Huppmann (2013b) for a discussion that this yields a convex problem.
A.2 The arc operator
By assumption, there is one independent operator for each arc.7 Each arc
can carry multiple gas types, with a weight factor to align dierent units of
7Given that the infrastructure service providers are price takers, this yields the same model
functionality as when there would have been a single arc operator for all the arcs in the system.
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measurements if necessary. For simplicity, the emission price is always paid at
the starting node of the arc.
max
fA;zA
X
y2Y;h2H
dfAyadurh
0@(pAyhae   trfAyae)fAyhae  X
g2G
pGyngems
A
yaegf
A
yhae   invAyazAya
1A
(3a)
st
X
e2EAa
wgtAaef
A
yhae  capAya +
X
y0<y
depAy0yaz
A
y0a (
A
yha) (3b)
zAya  expAya (Aya) (3c)
Market clearing
X
s2S
qAyhsae = f
A
yhae (p
A
yhae) (4)
A.3 The storage operator
The storage operator allows suppliers to transfer natural gas between dierent
seasons (low, high, peak) within a year. The capacity constraint (i.e., maximum
quantity stored) is the summation over all gas injected over a loading cycle. We
assume that all costs (losses and emissions) are accounted for during injection.
The storage operator only assigns the available capacity. The balancing of
gas that is extracted and injected (after losses) is modeled in the supplier's
optimization problem.
max
fO ;fO+
zO;zO ;zO+
X
y2Y;h2H
dfOynodurh
 
(pO yhno   trfO yno)fO yhno + pO+yhnofO+yhno  
X
g2G
pGyngems
O 
yogf
O 
yhno
  invOynozOyno   invO ynozO yno   invO+ynozO+yno
!
(5a)
st
X
h2HVvo
durhf
O 
yhno  capOyno +
X
y0<y
depOy0ynoz
O
y0no (
O
yvno) (5b)
fO yhno  capO yno +
X
y0<y
depO y0ynoz
O 
y0no (
O 
yhno) (5c)
fO+yhno  capO+yno +
X
y0<y
depO+y0ynoz
O+
y0no (
O+
yhno) (5d)
zOyno  expOyno (Oyno) (5e)
zO yno  expO yno (O yno) (5f)
zO+yno  expO+yno (O+yno) (5g)
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Market clearing
X
s2S
qO yhsno = f
O 
yhno (p
O 
yhno) (6)X
s2S
qO+yhsno = f
O+
yhno (p
O+
yhno) (7)
A.4 Final demand
The current version of NANGAM considers an unique demand sector. This sec-
tor maximizes its utility from the total energy consumption, after accounting for
gas and emission costs. We assume the nal demand to be a price-taker. For no-
tational convenience, the decision variables of nal demand (energy consumed)
is denoted by QD in the utility maximization problem below:
max
QD
X
y2Y;h2H
n2N;e2E
(24intDyhnd   12slpDyhnd
0@X
f2E
effDyndfQ
D
yhndf
1A35 effDyndeQDyhnde
  pDyhndeQDyhnde
  euccDyhndeQDyhnde  
1
2
euclDyhnde
 
QDyhnde
2  X
g2G
pGyngems
D
ydegQ
D
yhnde
)
(8)
The linear inverse demand curve is obtained by taking the rst-order condi-
tion of the quadratic utility maximization problem.
pDyhnde = eff
D
ynde
24intDyhnd   slpDyhnd
0@ X
s2S;f2E
effDyndfq
D
yhsndf
1A35
  euccDyhnde   euclDyhnde
 X
s2S
qDyhsnde
!
 
X
g2G
pGyngems
D
ydeg (9)
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